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Abstract 
I argue that we can get evidence for the temporal ontology of the universe by 
looking at the time. The argument is an extension of the ‘epistemic objection’ 
towards Growing Block theories. 
 
1. Introduction 
Metaphysicians disagree about the temporal ontology of the universe. Are there any past objects?              
Are there any future objects? ​Presentists ​say ‘no’ to both questions. ​Eternalists say ‘yes’ to both                
questions. ​Growing Block ​theorists say ‘yes’ to the first question, and ‘no’ to the second.               1
Shrinking Block​ theorists say ‘no’ to the first, and ‘yes’ to the second.  2
How are we to decide between these views? It seems like the only way to decide between them is                   
to engage in the complex metaphysical arguments that proponents of these views have put              
forward, perhaps with an eye towards the latest contemporary findings in fundamental physics.  
In other work, I have argued that this tempting thought is mistaken. Straightforward             
observational evidence can be brought to bear on the debate between Presentism and Eternalism              
(no fancy physics required). My goal in this paper is to extend these results, by showing that                 3
ordinary observational evidence can be brought to bear on the debate between Growing Block              
theorists, Shrinking Block theorists, and Eternalists. In fact, as we will see later, one way we can                 
empirically test these views is just by looking at the time! 
The arguments I will present below can also be seen as developments of the ‘epistemic               
objection’ to Growing Block theories, according to which we cannot know that we are              
(objectively) present if the Growing Block theory is true. Sider (2011) puts the epistemic              4
objection as follows: 
1 ​Moving Spotlight ​theorists also say ‘yes’ to both questions, but I will be setting aside the moving spotlight theory 
for the purposes of this paper. 
2 Shrinking block theory is the least popular of these views, but see Casati and Torrengo (2011) for more discussion. 
3 See Builes (2019a). 
4 There is a growing literature on the epistemic objection to the Growing Block theory (and the Moving Spotlight 
theory). For early presentations of the objection, see Braddon-Mitchell (2004) and Merricks (2006). For a recent 
survey and assessment of the epistemic objection, see Deasy and Tallant (2020). 
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We believe that we exist in the present; indeed, we take ourselves to know this. But given                 
the [Growing Block theory], there are ever so many people, with similar evidence to our               
own, who also think they are in the present but are wrong—they’re wrong because the               
times at which they are located do not have monadic presentness. George Washington,             
for example, thinks in 1776 that 1776 is present; we think, here in 2011, that 2011 is                 
present. We cannot both be right, since the property of presentness is monadic and              
possessed by only one moment. And our evidence is no better than Washington’s (we see               
flowers brightly blooming in 2011; he sees flowers brightly blooming in 1776, and so              
on), so it’s hard to believe that we’re more likely to be right than Washington. Indeed, it                 
seems likely that we’re both wrong, since 1776 and 2011 are merely two of the infinitely                
many times, only one of which has presentness. The [Growing Block theory] leads to              
skepticism about whether we’re in the present. (261) 
I will be arguing that the epistemic objection doesn’t merely threaten our knowledge of the               
objective present. The fact that we can’t be certain that we live on the edge of the Growing Block                   
(or the Shrinking Block) can be utilized as a premise in an argument that shows that the Growing                  
Block theory, the Shrinking Block theory, and Eternalism all make different observational            
predictions. These observational predictions can then be tested to yield ordinary, empirical            
evidence for these different theories of temporal ontology. 
 
2. A Toy Case 
Suppose you are in a universe that is finite in temporal extent. It began some finite time ago, and                   
it will end some finite time in the future. Moreover, suppose that, throughout the history of the                 
universe, there will only ever be two conscious agents, both of which are perfect duplicates who                
are located in rooms that are also perfect duplicates. One of the conscious agents lives a life that                  
is located earlier in time than the other. In order to distinguish the rooms, suppose that the earlier                  
room has a ‘1’ written on the outside of the room, and the later room has a ‘2’ written on the                     
outside. Both conscious agents know all of these facts. 
Because you know all of these facts, you know that you are located in one of these two rooms,                   
but you don’t know which. In other words, you have a kind of ‘self-locating’ or ​de se ignorance.                  
You might be located in the earlier ‘1’ room, or you might be located in the later ‘2’ room. 
The crucial question we will be asking is the following: ​how confident should you be that you                 
will observe a ‘1’ if you walked outside of your room? 
Let us first consider this question under the supposition of Eternalism. If Eternalism is true, the                
world is a four-dimensional static block, which contains two equally real, subjectively            
indistinguishable agents. On this kind of ontology, it seems clear that you should assign the               
following credences: 
Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Eternalism) = 1/2 
Cr( I am in the ‘2’ room | Eternalism) = 1/2 
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After all, you’re certain that both agents are equally real, and you are certain that they are                 
subjectively indistinguishable. Since you have no reason to privilege one room over the other, it               
would be completely arbitrary to assign any other credences. In fact, these 50-50 credences can               
be derived from a widely accepted version of the principle of indifference that is discussed in the                 
literature on self-locating belief. Roughly speaking, this principle of indifference states that, in             
any given possible world, your credence should be divided evenly among the agents that are               
subjectively indistinguishable from yourself.  5
Next, let us consider our question under the supposition of the Growing Block theory. On the                
Growing Block theory, our question crucially turns on ‘how much’ the block has grown. Let               
Growing Block​early be the hypothesis that only the ‘1’ room exists, because the edge of the                
growing block has yet to reach the ‘2’ room. Let Growing Block​late be the hypothesis that both                 
rooms exist, because the edge of the growing block has passed both rooms. Since you know that                 
you yourself exist, you are certain that at least ​one of the rooms exist, so you are certain that                   
either Growing Block​early or Growing Block​late is true (given that the Growing Block theory is               
true). 
Since the ‘2’ room doesn’t even exist according to Growing Block​early​, it is obvious that you                
should assign the following credences: 
Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Growing Block​early​) = 1 
Cr(I am in the ‘2’ room | Growing Block​early​) = 0 
Applying the same principle of indifference from above, we also get the following credences: 
Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Growing Block​late​) = 1/2 
Cr(I am in the ‘2’ room | Growing Block​late​) = 1/2 
Now, what should your credence be in Growing Block​early​? For our purposes, all we will need is                 
that it is rational to have a ​non-zero credence in Growing Block​early​. This seems perfectly               
reasonable. After all, the hypothesis that the edge of the Growing Block is somewhere between               
the earlier and later rooms is a hypothesis that is perfectly compatible with your evidence. In                
fact, given that the edge of the block could be any time after the existence of the first room, a                    
natural credence to give to Growing Block​early ​is the temporal distance between the two rooms               
divided by the temporal distance between the first room and the end of time. 
In any case, if we let ​g​ be your credence in Growing Block​early​, where ​g​ > 0, then we have that: 
Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Growing Block)  
5 Both Elga (2000) and Lewis (2001) appeal to this kind of principle in their original discussions of the Sleeping 
Beauty problem. In fact, almost every proposed solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem involves assigning equal 
credences to the hypotheses “The coin landed Tails and it is Monday” and “The coin landed Talis and it is Tuesday” 
on the basis of this kind of principle. For further defense of this principle, see Elga (2004). Weatherson (2005) 
criticizes the principle. 
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= Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Growing Block​early ​or Growing Block​late​) 
= 1*​g​ + (1/2)*(1-​g​) 
= (1+​g​)/2 
Consequently: 
Cr(I am in the ‘2’ room | Growing Block)  
= 1 - Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Growing Block)  
= (1-​g​)/2 
Let us finally consider our question under the supposition of the Shrinking Block theory. In this                
case, the very same issues arise from the Growing Block case. Let Shrinking Block​late be the                
hypothesis that the edge of the Shrinking Block is strictly between the two rooms, and let                
Shrinking Block​early be the hypothesis that the edge of the Shrinking Block is earlier than the                
earliest room. Again, it is obvious that you should assign the following credences: 
Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Shrinking Block​late​) = 0 
Cr(I am in the ‘2’ room | Shrinking Block​late​) = 1 
Applying our highly restricted principle of indifference: 
Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Shrinking Block​early​) = 1/2 
Cr(I am in the ‘2’ room | Shrinking Block​early​) = 1/2 
Letting ​s​ be your non-zero credence in Shrinking Block​late​, we have that: 
Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Shrinking Block)  
= Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Shrinking Block​early ​or Shrinking Block​late​) 
= 1/2*(1-​s​) + 0*​s 
= (1-​s​)/2 
Consequently: 
Cr(I am in the ‘2’ room | Shrinking Block)  
= 1 - Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Shrinking Block)  
= (1+​s​)/2 
We have completed answering our question on the supposition of Eternalism, Growing Block             
theory, and Shrinking Block theory. Given that ​g​,​ s​ > 0, our results are as follows: 
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Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Shrinking Block) < Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Eternalism)  
Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Eternalism) < Cr(I am in the ‘1’ room | Growing Block) 
Eternalism doesn’t give you any reason to favor either the hypothesis that you are in the ‘1’ room                  
or the hypothesis that you are in the ‘2’ room. You should be indifferent between both                
hypotheses given Eternalism. However, the Growing Block theory should make you more            
confident that you are in the earlier room, and the Shrinking Block theory should make you more                 
confident that you are in the later room. The reason for this is straightforward. On the Growing                 
Block theory, there’s a live chance that the ‘2’ room ​does not even exist​, so of course you can’t                   
be located in the ‘2’ room! After all, there’s a live chance that the edge of the block has not yet                     
passed the ‘2’ room. Similarly, on the Shrinking Block theory, there’s a live chance that the ‘1’                 
room does not even exist, which of course means that you can’t be located in the ‘1’ room.  
Having answered our original question, we can now show what we wanted to show. Suppose you                
finally decide to step outside of your room and observe the number on the outside. Turns out that                  
there’s a ‘1’ outside of your room! Conditionalizing on your evidence, your credence in Growing               
Block theory should increase, and your credence in Shrinking Block theory should decrease.             
After all, you were ​most ​confident that there would be a ‘1’ outside of your room given the                  
Growing Block theory, and you were ​least ​confident that there would be a ‘1’ outside of your                 
room given the Shrinking Block theory. Lastly, your credence in Eternalism should increase or              
decrease depending on the exact values of ​g​ and ​s​ that you assigned.  6
Congratulations, you’ve successfully received evidence about the temporal ontology of the           
universe by looking at a number written outside of a room! 
 
3. Look At The Time 
This toy case establishes the in ​principle possibility of receiving ordinary, observational            
evidence that is relevant to temporal ontology. While this in principle possibility is already              
6 This instance of conditionalization involves conditioning on a ​de se​ fact. It is an instance of what Meacham (2008) 
has called ‘Centered Conditionalization’. Although most philosophers would accept this instance of 
conditionalization, some have argued for a different way of conditioning on ​de se ​facts. An alternative updating 
procedure, defended by Meacham (2008), Cozik (2011), and Builes (2019b), is called ‘Compartmentalized 
Conditionalization’. Compartmentalized Conditionalization entails the ‘Relevance-Limiting Thesis’, according to 
which updating on irreducibly ​de se​ facts should not affect one’s credences in non-indexical hypotheses. For more 
on the Relevance-Limiting Thesis, see Titelbaum (2008, 2013). However, it is important to note that this toy case 
can ​still ​be used by those who endorse Compartmentalized Conditionalization. For example, when you see a ‘1’ on 
the outside of your room, you do not eliminate any (non-indexical) Eternalist hypothesis, but you ​do​ eliminate 
certain (non-indexical) Shrinking Block hypotheses. For example, you eliminate the hypothesis of Shrinking 
Block​late​. So, observing a ‘1’ gives you evidence for Eternalism over the Shrinking Block theory. Similarly, if you 
were to see a ‘2’ on the outside of your room, you would not eliminate any (non-indexical) Eternalist hypothesis, but 
you would eliminate certain (non-indexical) Growing Block hypotheses (e.g. you would eliminate Growing 
Block​early​). So, our toy case shows that you can receive ordinary observational evidence for these views in temporal 
ontology irrespective of the correct epistemology of self-locating belief. 
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surprising in itself, I’d like to suggest that the kind of issues involved in our toy case are in fact                    
ubiquitous in daily life.  
Here is an example. Within any busy work week, many people wake up in the same room, in the                   
same bed, at the same hour, perhaps by the same kind of alarm sound. Often times, the days can                   
pass by in a haze. When you wake up from a deep sleep on Thursday, you might initially not                   
remember exactly what day it is. It might be Wednesday, or it might be Thursday. You know that                  
you will in fact wake up on both of these days in roughly the same kind of situation, but you are                     
just unsure of which day is ​today​.  
Just as in our toy case, this is a case of self-locating or ​de se ignorance. In fact, how you should                     
reason about this ordinary case of self-locating ignorance is closely parallel to how you should               
reason about the toy case. Eternalism doesn’t favor the hypothesis that today is Wednesday or               
the hypothesis that today is Thursday. After all, given Eternalism, you’re certain that there are               
two perfectly real time-slices of you that exist on Wednesday and Thursday. You’re just unsure               
of which time-slice you currently are. However, just as in our toy case, the Growing Block                
theory gives you some reason to think you are the earlier Wednesday time-slice, and the               
Shrinking Block theory gives you some reason to think you are the later Thursday time-slice.               
After all, on the Growing Block theory, there’s a chance that your Thursday time-slice does not                
even exist, and on the Shrinking Block theory, there’s a chance that your Wednesday time-slice               
does not even exist. So, learning that you are the Wednesday time-slice should count as               7
evidence in favor of the Growing Block theory (and against the Shrinking Block theory). 
In general, there are cases in daily life where we lose track of the time. When we lose track of the                     
time, we acquire a kind of ​de se ignorance. We can entertain various live epistemic possibilities                
for what time it is, and we are unsure of which is correct. Eternalism doesn’t favor any of these                   
possibilities, but the Growing Block theory should make us biased towards earlier possibilities,             
and the Shrinking Block theory should make us biased towards later possibilities. So, in general,               
when we lose track of the time, we are in a position to gather evidence about the temporal                  
ontology of the universe. All we have to do is to look at the time.  
 
4. Conclusion 
I have described certain situations in which it is possible to gather straightforward, observational              
evidence about the temporal ontology of the universe. Furthermore, I have suggested that these              
7 One possible worry here is that the universe might have an infinite past and/or future. If the universe has an infinite 
future, then one might think it is reasonable to assign a credence of 0 to the hypothesis that the edge of the Growing 
Block is strictly between your Wednesday-waking and your Thursday-waking. After all, there is only a finite 
amount of time between your Wednesday-waking and your Thursday-waking, but there is an infinite amount of time 
after your Thursday-waking. Applying a natural kind of indifference principle has the implication that you should 
assign a credence of 0 to the hypothesis that the edge of the Growing Block is strictly between your 
Wednesday-waking and your Thursday-waking. In response to this objection, it seems to me that we should at least 
have a ​non-zero​ credence that the universe will have a finite future. In fact, there should be some number ​n​ such that 
we have non-zero credence that the universe will end before ​n ​years. If we do have such a non-zero credence, then 
applying this kind of indifference reasoning will result in an overall non-zero credence that the edge of the Growing 
Block is strictly between your Wednesday-waking and your Thursday-waking, as desired. 
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situations may in fact be ubiquitous. This result is not only intrinsically surprising, but it also                
serves as a powerful counterargument against those philosophers who are inclined to view             
debates in temporal ontology as somehow nonsubstantive. Some have suggested that debates            
about temporal ontology are merely verbal, or perhaps there is just no fact of the matter about the                  
correct temporal ontology of the universe. Views of this kind have been defended in different               
ways by Callender (2000), Meyer (2005), Dorato (2006) Savitt (2006), Balaguer (2014), and             
Norton (2015). However, if different views in temporal ontology make different observational            8
predictions, then it seems that even the most hardcore logical positivst should think that debates               
about temporal ontology are substantive. 
It is often thought that the epistemic objection to the Growing Block theory is a cause for                 
concern. At first blush, it seems that, unless the Growing Block theorist can know that they are                 
objectively present, then they should abandon their theory. The arguments I have presented here              
open up space for an alternative perspective on the Growing Block theorist’s epistemic situation.              
Rather than regarding the epistemic objection as a ​reductio ad absurdum ​of their ontological              
views, they can, at least in principle, view it as an exciting opportunity to experimentally verify                
their controversial ontological claims. I will leave it to the reader to decide which perspective is                
the more rational one to take. 
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